Public conversation about biological contributors to mental disorder often centers on whether the problem is “biological or not.” In this paper, we propose moving beyond this bifurcation to a very different question:how exactlyare these problems understood to be biological? Specifically, we consider four issues around which different interpretations of the body’s relationship to mental disorder exist:1. The body’s relationship to day-to-day action; 2. The extent to which the body is changeable; 3. The body’s relationship to context; 4. The degree to (...) which states of the body directly cause mental disorder.Drawing on the work of Merleau-Ponty and other phenomenologists, we examine different responses to these questions and associated implications for how mental health treatment and recovery come to be experienced. Finally, we consider broader questions these patterns raise, including why certain portrayals of the brain dominate public attention and how to foster more deliberation in this regard. (shrink)

According to proponents of the continuity hypothesis, metaphors represent one end of a spectrum of linguistic phenomena, which includes various forms of loosening/broadening, such as category extensions and approximations, as well as hyperbolic interpretations. The continuity hypothesis is used to establish that the inferences derived from the set of linguistic expressions mentioned above result from the same or nearly similar pragmatic processes. In this paper, we want to challenge that particular aspect of the continuity hypothesis. We do so based on (...) considerations and analysis of an understudied linguistic phenomenon that we call the metaphorical uses of proper names (MPNs). We first explain how MPNs represent a unique linguistic class distinguishable from, for example, nicknames. In addition, we offer some remarks on how MPNs can be understood against the background of current debates between referentialists and predicativists about names. Our discussion leads us to conclude that MPNs are categorically different from literal interpretations of proper names. We spell out the consequences that the results of our analysis have for the continuity hypothesis. (shrink)

After offering a definition of “conspiracy theory” and highlighting some interesting interconnections between conspiracy theories and religious worldviews, we turn to epistemologically relevant analogies. Proponents of conspiracy theories and religions have often been accused of the same biases and epistemic vices, e.g., gullibility, hypersensitive proneness to personal explanations, or overemphasis on holistic thinking. So-called Generalism is best understood as the thesis that conspiracy theories are guilty until proven innocent because they share certain “bunkum-making properties.” However, we argue for the particularist (...) position, i.e. the position that a general epistemic presumption against conspiracy theories is not tenable. Building a negative valence into the very notion of conspiracy theory is not convincing either. Given the analogies, our analysis supports similar verdicts with respect to religious worldviews: Like conspiracy theories, they should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis rather than being dismissed simply for being religious. Finally, we reject Bezazel’s view that both conspiracy theories and religious worldviews constitute a-rational frames or “bliks” that, besides other things, ground what counts as an explanation. Such a proposal squares badly with epistemic misgivings about particularly preposterous examples of conspiracy theories and religious worldviews. (shrink)

In his transcendental approach, Cassirer argues that an objective world is not given and then simply copied by our cognitive faculties; rather, it is gained through the development of symbolic thought and perception. According to Cassirer, language plays a crucial role in this process of objectification. In this paper, the close relationship between language and symbolism in Cassirer’s philosophy will be delineated. This will also shed light on possible distinctions between human speech and animal communication. Furthermore, the relation of language (...) to the different functions of consciousness and to the symbolic forms of myth and science will be addressed. Finally, based on the former considerations of language and objectification, Cassirer’s conceptions of reality and truth will be explicated and critically evaluated. It will be argued that his approach offers several interesting and promising insights but is nonetheless in danger of falling short in explaining the difference between artefacts and natural kinds. (shrink)

This paper examines different functions of metaphors in religious language. In order to do that it will be analyzed in which ways metaphorical language can be understood as irreducible. First, it will be argued that metaphors communicate more than just propositional contents. They also frame their targets with an imagistic perspective that cannot be reduced to a literal paraphrase. Furthermore, there are also cases where metaphors are used to fill gaps of what can be expressed with literal language. In order (...) to clarify this function of catachresis the notion of de re metaphors will be introduced. With those metaphors we can convey contents that we cannot conceptualize independently from a certain context of utterance. Hence, with such metaphors we can reach beyond the limits of our conceptual repertoire which is a crucial function for religious language. Finally, the consistency and plausibility of the radical position that all assertions about God are irreducibly and necessarily metaphorical if they are supposed to be true will be discussed on the basis of the results of the former considerations about the irreducibility of metaphors. (shrink)

Powerful transformer models based on neural networks such as GPT-4 have enabled huge progress in natural language processing. This paper identifies three challenges for computer programs dealing with metaphors. First, the phenomenon of Twice-Apt-Metaphors shows that metaphorical interpretations do not have to be triggered by syntactical, semantic or pragmatic tensions. The detection of these metaphors seems to involve a sense of aesthetic pleasure or a higher-order theory of mind, both of which are difficult to implement into computer programs. Second, the (...) contexts relative to which metaphors are interpreted are not simply given but must be reconstructed based on pragmatic considerations that can involve presuppositional pretence. If computer programs cannot produce or understand such a form of pretence, they will have problems dealing with certain metaphors. Finally, adequately interpreting and reacting to some metaphors seems to require the ability to have internal, first-personal experiential and affective states. Since it is questionable whether computer programs have such mental states, it can be assumed that they will have problems with these kinds of metaphors. (shrink)

After offering a definition of “conspiracy theory” and highlighting some interesting interconnections between conspiracy theories and religious worldviews, we turn to epistemologically relevant analogies. Proponents of conspiracy theories and religions have often been accused of the same biases and epistemic vices, e.g., gullibility, hypersensitive proneness to personal explanations or overemphasis on holistic thinking. So-called Generalism is best understood as the thesis that conspiracy theories are guilty until proven innocent because they share certain “bunkum-making properties” (Cassam 2015). However, we argue for (...) the particularist view, i.e. that a general epistemic presumption against conspiracy theories is not tenable. Building a negative valence into the very notion of conspiracy theory is not convincing either. Given the analogies, our analysis supports similar verdicts with respect to religious worldviews: Like conspiracy theories they should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, rather than being dismissed simply for being religious. Finally, we reject Bezazel’s (2021) view that both conspiracy theories and religious worldviews constitute a-rational frames or “bliks” that, besides other things, ground what counts as an explanation. Such a proposal squares badly with epistemic misgivings about particularly preposterous examples of conspiracy theories and religious worldviews. (shrink)

With the position, he labels as “new” or “metalinguistic agnosticism” Robin LePoidevin can avoid some problems with which fictionalists about religious language are confronted. Religious fictionalism is a position according to which all religious claims[1] are considered to be false when taken at face value. But because fictionalists about religious language think that certain religious worldviews have pragmatic benefits, they interpret several claims in such worldviews as true in fiction. This enables them to gain pragmatic benefits because they live as (...) if a certain religious worldview were true. Nonetheless, they don’t believe that the respective worldview represents the non-fictional reality.[2][1] In the following I understand a “religious claim“ either as the claim that God exists or as a claim that presupposes the existence of God. Since also Le Poidevin focuses on theistic religions I want to keep this focus in my response. Nonetheless, it should be kept in mind that religious fictionalism is not restricted to theistic religions. I also think that metalinguistic agnosticism and the argumentation in this paper could in principle be extended to non-theistic religions.[2] A defense of religious fictionalism can be found in for example Andrew S. Eshleman, “Can an Atheist Believe in God?”, Religious Studies 41, no. 2 and Andrew S. Eshleman, “Religious Fictionalism Defended: Reply to Cordry”, Religious Studies 46, no. 1. (shrink)

In dieser Abhandlung wird zunächst die Analogielehre des Thomas von Aquin dargestellt. Darauf folgt die Entfaltung zweier grundlegender sprachphilosophischer Probleme dieser Theorie. In einem dritten Schritt werden zwei mögliche Alternativen zur thomistischen Theorie vorgestellt. Gemäß der ersten könnte man wie William Alston oder Richard Swinburne für eine Form der Univozität zwischen der Bedeutung der Ausdrücke plädieren, die von Gott und den Menschen gemeinsam gebraucht werden. Die zweite, hier favorisierte Lösungsstrategie kann über eine metaontologische Unterscheidung zwischen fundamentalen und nicht-fundamentalen Wahrheiten konsistent (...) darlegen, wie man mit wörtlich verstandener Sprache wahre Aussagen über das Wesen Gottes machen kann, ohne dabei die Einfachheit Gottes preisgeben zu müssen. (shrink)

The series offers a publication forum for innovative works on all topics of analytic philosophy. The focus is on the disciplines of theoretical philosophy: metaphysics, ontology, epistemology, philosophy of language, logic. Furthermore, works that additionally include contributions to the history of philosophy are also welcome.

Religion scheint auf den ersten Blick eine besondere Anfälligkeit für Dogmatismus zu besitzen. Religiöse Überzeugungen sind häufig tief im Leben der Menschen verankert und religiöse Hingabe scheint in Spannung zu jedem Zweifel an dem Inhalt der jeweiligen Religion zu stehen. Auf der Basis von Ernst Cassirers Überlegungen kann im Gegensatz zu diesem Anschein eine Konzeption von Religion entwickelt werden, wonach sich diese gerade durch eine kritische Reflexion auf die eigenen Inhalte auszeichnet und im Gegensatz zu Aberglauben, Irrglaube und Wahnglaube, zu (...) immer größerer Entfaltung von Freiheit führt. (shrink)

Classical deviance theories about metaphor argue that the metaphorical sense of a word or expression, w, deviates from the sense of the word or expression interpreted literally. Developments in lexical pragmatics challenge these theories by claiming that deviance pervades (nearly) all aspects of linguistic communication. If deviance is the norm, then classical explanans offer little to no insight. In fact, many theorists have abandoned the idea of the literal-metaphorical distinction. This move carries significant consequences for theories of language and communication. (...) We argue against this move and in favour of a linguistically robust literal-metaphorical distinction. We have three goals: The first is to argue that the literal-metaphorical distinction is important for theories of language and communication. The second is to assess Allott and Textor’s Non-Conformity View of deviance which gives up the idea that deviance is marked by a departure from conventional word meaning. Pace Allott and Textor, we claim that the literal-metaphorical distinction must ultimately be couched in some account of lexicalised meaning. Our third goal is to develop a form of qualified deviance that avoids what we take to be shortcomings of the Non-Conformity View. (shrink)

At the beginning of 2020, COVID-19 became a global problem. Despite all the efforts to emphasize the relevance of preventive measures, not everyone adhered to them. Thus, learning more about the characteristics determining attitudinal and behavioral responses to the pandemic is crucial to improving future interventions. In this study, we applied machine learning on the multi-national data collected by the International Collaboration on the Social and Moral Psychology of COVID-19 (N = 51,404) to test the predictive efficacy of constructs from (...) social, moral, cognitive, and personality psychology, as well as socio-demographic factors, in the attitudinal and behavioral responses to the pandemic. The results point to several valuable insights. Internalized moral identity provided the most consistent predictive contribution—individuals perceiving moral traits as central to their self-concept reported higher adherence to preventive measures. Similar was found for morality as cooperation, symbolized moral identity, self-control, open-mindedness, collective narcissism, while the inverse relationship was evident for the endorsement of conspiracy theories. However, we also found a non-negligible variability in the explained variance and predictive contributions with respect to macro-level factors such as the pandemic stage or cultural region. Overall, the results underscore the importance of morality-related and contextual factors in understanding adherence to public health recommendations during the pandemic. (shrink)

Textual entailment is a relationship that obtains between fragments of text when one fragment in some sense implies the other fragment. The automation of textual entailment recognition supports a wide variety of text-based tasks, including information retrieval, information extraction, question answering, text summarization, and machine translation. Much ingenuity has been devoted to developing algorithms for identifying textual entailments, but relatively little to saying what textual entailment actually is. This article is a review of the logical and philosophical issues involved in (...) providing an adequate definition of textual entailment. We show that many natural definitions of textual entailment are refuted by counterexamples, including the most widely cited definition of Dagan et al. We then articulate and defend the following revised definition: T textually entails H = df typically, a human reading T would be justified in inferring the proposition expressed by H from the proposition expressed by T. We also show that textual entailment is context-sensitive, nontransitive, and nonmonotonic. (shrink)

In August 2001, the Israeli Ministry of Health issued its Limitation of Smoking in Public Places Order, categorically forbidding smoking in hospitals. This forced the mental health system to cope with the issue of smoking inside psychiatric hospitals. The main problem was smoking by compulsorily hospitalized psychiatric patients in closed wards. An attempt by a psychiatric hospital to implement the tobacco smoking restraint instruction by banning the sale of cigarettes inside the hospital led to the development of a black market (...) and cases of patient exploitation in return for cigarettes. This article surveys the literature dealing with smoking among psychiatric patients, the role of smoking in patients and the moral dilemmas of taking steps to prevent smoking in psychiatric hospitals. It addresses the need for public discussion on professional caregivers’ dilemmas between their commitment to uphold the law and their duty to act as advocates for their patients’ rights and welfare. (shrink)

BackgroundWhether patients in the vegetative state (VS), minimally conscious state (MCS) or the clinically related locked-in syndrome (LIS) should be kept alive is a matter of intense controversy. This study aimed to examine the moral attitudes of lay people to these questions, and the values and other factors that underlie these attitudes.MethodOne hundred ninety-nine US residents completed a survey using the online platform Mechanical Turk, comprising demographic questions, agreement with treatment withdrawal from each of the conditions, agreement with a series (...) of ethical principles and three personality tests.ResultsMore supported treatment withdrawal from VS (40.2 % agreed, 17.6 % disagreed) than MCS (20.6 %, 41.2 %) or LIS (25.3 %, 35.8 %). Agreement with treatment withdrawal was negatively correlated with religiosity (r = −0.272, P < 0.001), though showed no significant relationship with need for cognition or empathy, and only a partial association with utilitarian judgment in a standard moral dilemma. Support for treatment withdrawal was most strongly associated with endorsement of the importance of patient autonomy, dignity, suffering, best interests. Distributive justice was not given significant weight by most. Importantly, agreement with treatment withdrawal was noticeably higher when considered from a first as opposed to third person perspective for VS (Z = −6.056, P < 0.001), MCS (Z = −6.746, P < 0.001) and LIS (Z = −6.681, P < 0.001).ConclusionLay attitudes to withdrawal of treatment in brain damaged patients are largely shaped by values similar to those central to the secular ethical debate. Neither traditional values such as the sanctity of life nor utilitarian values relating to resource allocation seem to play a central role. Far greater weight is given to autonomy, which may explain why participants were far more willing to endorse withdrawal of treatment when the issue was presented in the first person, or in relation to a concrete case involving a patient’s explicit wishes. Surveys focusing on abstract cases presented in the third person may not provide an accurate picture of lay attitudes to these critical ethical questions. (shrink)

Jacobs introduces the issues, language, concepts and positions central to ethical theorizing. Entries range from antiquity to the present and basic to advance. Cross-referencing allows readers to explore topics in depth. Items explain complex issues of normative ethics, metaethics and moral psychology in non-technical language.

Die Syntax als die Disziplin der Linguistik, die den Satzbau zum Gegenstand hat, ist heute in eine Vielfalt einzelner Schulen zerfallen, die sich oft radikal in ihren Zielen und Methoden unterscheiden. Diese Schulenvielfalt ist z.T. darauf zurückzuführen, daß traditionelle, strukturalistische und dependenzgrammatische Ansätze den in den sechziger Jahren einsetzenden Siegeszug der Generativen Grammatik überlebt haben, unter anderem, weil sie sich bei der Erstellung von nicht rein theoretisch orientierten Sprachbeschreibungen als handlicher erwiesen. Aber auch die interne Entwicklung der Generativen Grammatik trug (...) zur Schulenvermehrung bei, insbesondere die schon früh beginnende Propagierung von Modellen, die sich mehr oder weniger weit von dem an den Arbeiten Chomskys orientierten Standard-Modell entfernten. Hinzu kamen neue Schulen, die sich durch Methoden und Ergebnisse der Logik, der Pragmatik oder der Universalienforschung inspirieren ließen und denen gemeinsam ist, daß sie dem generativen Ideal einer autonomen Syntax die Forderung nach einer inhaltlich-funktionalen Fundierung entgegensetzten. Das Handbuch versucht, diese verschiedenen Auffassungen darüber, was die Syntax zu tun hat und wie sie es zu tun hat, möglichst vollständig zu dokumentieren, und zwar sowohl unter systematischen Gesichtspunkten als auch im Hinblick auf die wissenschaftshistorische Entwicklung, die von der Sprachforschung der Antike bis zu den aktuellsten Ausprägungen der erwähnten Theoriemodelle dargestellt wird, wobei auch Ausblicke in die indische und arabische Grammatiktradition gegeben werden. So werden zahlreiche Konvergenzen sichtbar, und so kann sich der Leser ein Urteil darüber bilden, ob und wo die Schulendiversifikation mit wissenschaftlichen Fortschritten verbunden war. - Dabei wurde jedoch die Aufgabe einer umfassenden Dokumentation der syntaktischen Theorienbildung nicht so interpretiert, daß alle Richtungen in gleichem Umfang vertreten sein sollen. Vielmehr waren bestimmte Gewichtungen unumgänglich. So wurde der Generativen Grammatik in ihren verschiedenen Spielarten besondere Aufmerksamkeit gewidmet, da von ihr die meisten Impulse ausgingen. Neben der Dokumentation der syntaktischen Schulen ist es Hauptaufgabe des Handbuchs, Materialien über die variierenden Ausprägungen syntaktischer Phänomene in den Sprachen der Welt sowie über Tendenzen der sprachhistorischen Veränderung des Satzbaus zur Verfügung zu stellen. Die Autoren haben sich bemüht, ihre Beiträge auch für nicht eingearbeitete Leser verständlich und instruktiv zu gestalten. Damit spricht das Handbuch nicht nur Sprachwissenschaftler, sondern auch andere Berufsgruppen an, die in ihrer Tätigkeit mit syntaktischen Fragen in Berührung kommen, etwa Psychologen, Lehrer, EDV-Fachleute, Übersetzer, Lektoren u.a.m. (shrink)

Betrachtet man die Geschichte des Begriffs ‚Phänomenologie‘, ist nicht auf den ersten Blick klar, was darunter zu verstehen ist. Wie Schuhmann (1984 ) herausgearbeitet hat, tritt dieser Begriff in der Philosophiegeschichte auf, noch lange bevor Edmund Husserl sich ihn zu Eigen machte, um sein eigenes philosophisches Projekt zu beschreiben. Auch hinderte Husserls Versuch, diesen Begriff für die Beschreibung seines eigenen einmaligen Projekts zu beanspruchen, seine Zeitgenossen (z.B. Pfänder, Reinach, Stein) keineswegs daran, denselben Begriff ebenfalls zur Beschreibung ihrer jeweiligen Projekte und (...) Methoden zu verwenden. Es versteht sich also, dass Husserl selbst beträchtlichen Aufwand betrieb, um zu definieren, was der Begriff ‚Phänomenologie‘ in seinen Augen zu bedeuten hatte. Zum Zeitpunkt der Publikation des ersten Buches seiner Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie im Jahre 1913 charakterisiert Husserl Phänomenologie als eine neue Wissenschaft, die sich von jeder anderen, bereits geschichtlich verankerten Wissenschaft wie Physik, Psychologie oder Kulturwissenschaft unterscheidet (Hua III/1, 1). Diese Darstellung von Phänomenologie lässt auf Anhieb eine wichtige Abweichung von seiner einstigen Gleichsetzung von Phänomenologie und deskriptiver Psychologie in den Logischen Untersuchungen (1901) erkennen. In der breiteren philosophischen Landschaft wären angesichts Husserls positiver Bestimmung dessen, was diese phänomenologische Wissenschaft ist, möglicherweise auch heute noch viele genauso irritiert wie einige der damaligen Teilnehmer des VI. Kongresses für experimentelle Psychologie, denen Husserl 1914 erklärte: „Analog wie die reine Geometrie Wesenslehre des ‚reinen‘ Raumes bzw. Wissenschaft von den ideal möglichen Raumgestalten ist, ist die reine Phänomenologie Wesenslehre des ‚reinen‘ Bewusstseins, Wissenschaft von den ideal möglichen Bewusstseinsgestalten (mit ihren ‚immanenten Korrelaten‘)“ (Schumann 1914, 144-5). Was heute wie damals für ein Verständnis dieser Darstellung von Phänomenologie der Klärung bedarf, ist Husserls Beschreibung der Phänomenologie als einer Wesenslehre, d.h. einer reinen oder eidetischen Wissenschaft, ebenso wie seine Aussage, deren Untersuchungsgegenstand sei das von ihm sogenannte reine Bewusstsein. Nur indem man die beiden Bedeutungen von ‚rein‘ erhellt, die hiermit angesprochen sind, wird auch deutlich, inwiefern Husserl behaupten kann, Phänomenologie unterscheide sich von anderen Wissenschaften: sowohl von empirischen wie Physik oder experimenteller Psychologie als auch von anderen eidetischen Wissenschaften wie Geometrie und deskriptiver Psychologie. Diese Erläuterung zeigt nicht nur, inwiefern Phänomenologie von all diesen Disziplinen verschieden ist, sondern auch, inwiefern sie mit ihnen zusammenhängt – und damit ist gerade die Idee der Phänomenologie begründet. (shrink)

This is the 8th edition of the book, with eight new essays to the volume. Table of contents: Are We Having Sex Now or What? (Greta Christina); Sexual Perversion (Thomas Nagel); Plain Sex (Alan Goldman); Sex and Sexual Perversion (Robert Gray); Masturbation and the Continuum of Sexual Activities (Alan Soble); Love: What’s Sex Got to Do with It? (Natasha McKeever); Is “Loving More” Better? The Values of Polyamory (Elizabeth Brake); What Is Sexual Orientation? (Robin Dembroff); Sexual Orientation: What Is It? (...) (Kathleen Stock); Asexuality (Luke Brunning and Natasha McKeever); LGBTQ ... Z? (Kathy Rudy); How to Be a Pluralist About Gender Categories (Katharine Jenkins); The Negotiative Theory of Gender Identity and the Limits of First-Person Authority (Burkay Ozturk); Racial Sexual Desires (Raja Halwani); Sex and Technology: The Ethics of Virtual Connection (Neil McArthur); A Realist Sexual Ethics (Micah Newman); Sexual Morality and the Concept of Using Another Person (Thomas Mappes); Sexual Use (Alan Soble); Dark Desires (Seiriol Morgan); The Harms of Consensual Sex (Robin West); Casual Sex, Promiscuity, and Objectification (Raja Halwani); Is Prostitution Harmful? (Ole Martin Moen); BDSM (Shaun Miller); Two Views of Sexual Ethics: Promiscuity, Pedophilia, and Rape (David Benatar); Sexual Gifts and Sexual Duties (Alan Soble); A Bibliography of the Philosophy of Sex . (shrink)

I am very grateful to Natalja, Jacob and Sebastian for their kind attention to my paper, and for their many insights on this topic, which have materially helped me get clearer about some of the issues. All the points of disagreement are constructive and it has been both a pleasure and an education to engage with them. I’m also happy to note some points of agreement, too! Here I attempt to reply to some of the objections.

This article aims to apply the main theses of the finitist account of knowledge of the Strong Programme of the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SPSSK) to cognitive neuroscience, understood as a methodologically advanced, transdisciplinary research enterprise belonging to the tradition of natural sciences. The text reconstructs the argumentative line of the Strong Programme’s finitism, pointing to its theoretical sources: the late Wittgensteinian semantic concepts together with his rule-following considerations and the network concept of language proposed by Mary Hesse. The application (...) of the conceptual grid of the Strong Programme to contemporary neurocognitive sciences suggests that the natural science scientific and research enterprise on the neurophysiological substrate of cognition is a collective, institutionalised thought process that can be described as a social practice of concept (kind terms) application. This social process of using concepts proceeds in accordance with the concept of meaning- and rule-finitism. Grounded in this concept, the normativity of reference is explained based on the community thesis. If the finitist approach to meaning and knowledge proposed by the Edinburgh School is correct, two conclusions follow. The first directly follows from the formulation of the theses of classification and knowledge finitism: both the future use of neurocognitive terms and the future implications of neuroscientific beliefs are open-ended. The second is that any potential neurocognitive attempts to establish the neuronal mechanism behind meaning determinism are inevitably conducted in the mode of meaning finitism. Consequently, SPSSK seems to precede, in a logical order, all possible results of neurocognitive research, which turns out, like allnatural sciences, a conceptually open-ended and indeterminate system. In traditional epistemic terms, SPSSK claims that no cognitive neuroscientific claim is ever indefeasibly true or false. The crucial conclusion is that any potential neurocognitive attempts to account for the idea of meaning determinism and pinpoint the neuromechanism of semantic closure must themselves be semantically open-ended. (shrink)

The inevitability of particular interpretations: catholicism and science Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11016-010-9426-z Authors Don O’Leary, Department of Anatomy, Biosciences Institute, University College Cork, Cork, Ireland Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.

Une religion est un dispositif de croyance qui peut s’employer dans le sens de l’émancipation ou être dévoyé par des dispositifs de domination, de persécution, voire de terreur. Les analyses du djihadisme sous-estiment trop souvent sa dimension religieuse, notamment messianique et apocalyptique.

The practice and task of the philosophical interpretation of Scripture has been treated as a conversation-stopper within the academy. This collection corrects that tendency by offering substantive accounts of the role of Scripture in the philosophical thought of fifteen American philosophers.

The health and fitness of United States presidents has been a matter of concern since the Constitutional Convention. Several United States presidents, including James Madison, James Garfield, and Woodrow Wilson, were significantly impaired during portions of their tenure. Yet how to address this issue has proved both ethically and politically challenging, increasingly so during our nation's current period of elevated polarization. This essay reviews the history of presidential impairment and the range of proposals that have been offered to address it. (...) Ultimately, the essay argues that any effort to require the release of medical records or to evaluate the president while in office is likely to prove ineffective and politically unworkable, but also that providing the public with more medical information about candidates and presidents is unlikely to prove useful to voters in rendering their decisions. (shrink)

This paper approaches the question of Levinas' relation to philosophy by situating his understanding of transcendence next to that of Leibniz. After offering some preliminary examples, I detail the structure of transcendence in the philosophies of Leibniz and Levinas, focusing on Leibniz's Principles of Nature and Grace and Levinas’ Essence and Disinterestedness. From here, I return to the question of whether Levinas’ thinking can be regarded as moving beyond philosophy as such. I conclude with some thoughts on what it would (...) take for a thinking of transcendence to genuinely move past the maneuvers so characteristic of philosophical thinking. (shrink)

ABSTRACTPeople can be moved and overwhelmed, a phenomenon typically accompanied by goose-bumps and tears. We argue that these feelings of being moved are not limited to situations that are appraise...